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Previously identified neural correlates of deception, such as the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and parietal
regions, have proven to be unreliable neural markers of deception, most likely because activity in these
regions reflects executive processes that are not specific to deception. Herein, we report the first fMRI study
that provides strong preliminary evidence that the neural activity associated with perception but not
executive processes could offer a better marker of deception with regard to face familiarity. Using a
face-recognition task, activity in the left precuneus during the perception of familiar faces accuratelymarked
11 of 13 subjects who lied about not knowing faces that were in fact familiar to them. This level of
classification accuracy is much higher than the level predicted by chance and agrees with other findings by
experts in lie detection.
T
he current understanding of deception has relied heavily on behavioralmethodology that offers only indirect
measurements of lying, and existing behavioral models of deception leave room for improvement1,2. For
example, the average lie detection accuracy for most people is only slightly greater than chance3,4, and even
expert lie detection in high-stakes scenarios has reached a mean accuracy of only 67.15%5.
Recent advances in functional neuroimaging (e.g. fMRI) have led to broad advances in the direct measurement
of brain activity during deception. Activity in the prefrontal, cingulate, and parietal regions has consistently been
identified during deception in fMRI studies6–18 regardless of the experimental paradigm or the affective valence
(i.e., the emotion value) of the stimuli employed9,10,15. However, activity in these regions has not been a reliable
marker of deception, likely because the neural activity in these areas is not unique to deception11,19–23. For example,
the workingmemory and other executive processes subserved by the prefrontal-cingulate-parietal regions24–32 can
also be enlisted for behavioral purposes other than deception.
Because perception occurs rapidly and automatically, it is impossible for an individual to consciously and
strategically manipulate the neural activity associated with their perceptual processing of a stimulus. Hence,
the neural activity that is coupled to perception, and visual perception in particular (which has a well-
defined neural network and activity), has a unique advantage in revealing the truth even when a person
intends to lie.
The perception of familiar faces is an unconscious and automatic process that is usually accomplished within a
few hundred milliseconds33. This perception is also associated with a unique pattern of neural activity that can be
readily measured using fMRI. Previous studies have shown that the perception of familiar faces is closely
associated with activity in the anterior paracingulate cortex, the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS)/
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and the precuneus34. Further work by Bhatt et al.35, who studied deception using
a face-recognition paradigm, explained that the activity observed in the prefrontal-cingulate-parietal regions
during cognitive processes was associated with the execution of deception and that the same activity in the
precuneus was associated with face recognition; this finding was in agreement with previous reports on the
neural activity associated with the perception and recognition of faces34.
In this study, we employed a face-recognition paradigm requiring that the subjects both lie and tell the truth
regarding the familiarity of faces. Our findings offer important preliminary evidence that activity in the left
precuneus (i.e., the perception of stimuli) but not in the prefrontal or parietal regions (i.e., executive processes)
during deception could accurately classify the familiarity of the face being viewed and therefore reveal whether the
subject knew the person in the photo, even when the subject intended to conceal the truth.
SUBJECT AREAS:
COOPERATION
MORALITY
EMPATHY
AGENCY
Received
12 December 2012
Accepted
19 March 2013
Published
10 April 2013
Correspondence and
requests for materials
should be addressed to
T.M.C.L. (tmclee@hku.
hk) or C.C.H.C.
(chetwyn.chan@polyu.
edu.hk)
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 1636 | DOI: 10.1038/srep01636 1
Results
Behavioral results. The mean values and standard deviations of the
reaction time in each of the four conditions were 7016 151 ms (TF),
753 6 136 ms (TU), 783 6 137 ms (LF), and 788 6 155 ms (LU).
The mean values and standard deviations of the accuracy in each of
the four conditions were 39.36 1.2 (TF), 37.26 3.2 (TU), 38.56 2.4
(LF), and 38.2 6 2.0 (LU).
We analyzed the reaction times and accuracy of the participants
using a two-way repeated measures ANOVA model to examine the
effect of the lie/truth condition and the effect of familiarity.We found
a significant main effect of the condition (F(1, 12) 5 6.506; P 5 0.025)
on the reaction time, which is consistent with previous findings that
the reaction times in deceptive conditions are significantly longer
than those in truthful conditions16,36–39. There was also a significant
main effect of familiarity (F(1, 12) 5 7.624; P 5 0.017), with shorter
reaction times for familiar faces than for unfamiliar faces. The inter-
action effect between the condition and familiarity (F(1, 12) 5 4.033;
P 5 0.068) was significant at the trend level. These results indicated
that participants respondedmore quickly to familiar faces in both the
lie and truth conditions, with a particularly short reaction time when
telling the truth regarding familiar faces.
The accuracy rate for familiar faces was also significantly higher
than for unfamiliar faces, as revealed by the significant main effect of
the familiarity (F(1, 12) 5 7.327; P 5 0.019). The main effect of the
condition was not significant for the accuracy rate (F(1, 12) 5 0.118;
P5 0.737), whereas the interaction effect between the familiarity and
condition (F(1, 12) 5 3.636; P 5 0.081) was significant at the trend
level.
Imaging results.An analysis of the main effect of familiarity showed
that the activity of the precuneus was significant based not only the
corrected P, 0.05 determined by theAlphaSimprogrambut also the
cluster-level FWE-corrected P , 0.05. Post hoc t-tests revealed that
the activity of this region was stronger for perceiving familiar faces
than for unfamiliar faces (Table 1, Fig. 1a).
An analysis of the main effect of the cue for deception also iden-
tified activity in two other brain regions: the inferior frontal and the
inferior parietal. In particular, the inferior frontal activity was sig-
nificant according to the cluster-level FWE-corrected P, 0.05. Post
hoc t-tests revealed that these regions indicate stronger activity for
lying than for truth-telling (Table 1, Fig. 1b). None of the examined
regions showed a significant familiarity-by-cue interaction effect.
Further analysis indicated that the strength of the neural activity
for perceiving familiar faces was much greater in regions underlying
perceptual processes (i.e., the precuneus) than in those underlying
executive processes (i.e., inferior frontal and inferior parietal
regions), regardless of whether the subject intended to lie (Fig. 2).
We further observed a greater number of activated voxels (a
difference of at least 44 voxels as determined by the AlphaSim
correction procedure) in the left precuneus when perceiving familiar
faces compared with unfamiliar faces in 11 of 13 subjects while lying
and in 12 of 13 subjects while telling the truth (Table 2). In particular,
all of the subjects had fewer activated voxels in the precuneus when
perceiving unfamiliar faces than when viewing familiar faces during
both conditions (Table 3).
Although we found a high level of activity in the precuneus when
differentiating familiar from unfamiliar faces, our findings of the
main effect for the cue (lie vs. truth) indicated that activity in the
inferior frontal and inferior parietal regions (i.e., regions that have
frequently been identified as associated with deception) is generally
unreliable for detecting the deception of face familiarity. Nine of the
13 subjects had more activated voxels in the left inferior frontal
region (a difference of at least 5) when perceiving familiar faces
compared with unfamiliar faces during the lying condition; however,
none of these subjects exhibited a similar response during the truth-
telling condition (Table 2). In contrast, 9 and 3 subjects had fewer
activated voxels in this region when perceiving unfamiliar faces com-
pared with familiar faces during the lie and truth conditions, respect-
ively (Table 3).
In the left inferior parietal region, 5 of the 13 subjects exhibited a
greater number of activated voxels (a difference of at least 4) when
perceiving familiar faces compared with unfamiliar faces during the
lying condition, whereas 2 of the 13 subjects exhibited a similar
response during the truth-telling condition (Table 2). However, 10
and 8 of the 13 subjects exhibited fewer activated voxels in this region
when perceiving unfamiliar faces compared to familiar faces during
the lie and truth conditions, respectively (Table 3).
Faces versus affective pictures. To better understand the specificity
of the precuneus activity in the face-recognition paradigm, we
reanalyzed a data set from a previous fMRI deception study15 that
used affective pictures of positive and negative valence as stimuli. We
found that among all of the participants in the study, only 2 and 5 of
themhad a greater number of activated voxels in the precuneus in the
lie. truth contrast for the positive and negative stimuli, respectively,
whereas 9 of them had fewer activated voxels in the precuneus in the
truth . lie contrast for both the positive and negative stimuli.
Discussion
The neuroimaging results and the BOLD signal ratings of the indi-
vidual participants demonstrated that the BOLD signals in the left
precuneus could be used to accurately predict whether the subject
knew the person in the photo. The signals in the left precuneus
remained obvious even when an individual intended to lie about a
Table 1 | Brain regions showing significant main effects of famili-
arity and cue
Brain region BA Side
MNI coordinates
Cluster T-valuex y z
(a) Main effect of familiarity
Precuneus* 7 L 26 254 18 362 5.36
(b) Main effect of cue
Inferior frontal gyrus* 47 L 252 22 2 160 4.79
Inferior parietal lobule 40 L 254 254 36 84 4.16
*These regions satisfied the cluster-level FWE correction threshold at P , 0.05.
Figure 1 | Brain regions showing the significant main effects of
familiarity and cue.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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familiar face being unfamiliar, strongly suggesting that activity in the
left precuneus could potentially indicate the deception of face famili-
arity. Because we rated the pattern of BOLD signals for each par-
ticipant, the error variance introduced by individual variation was
tightly controlled. In contrast, although the observation of activity in
the frontal and parietal regions is nearly universal in fMRI deception
studies, such activity was not reliable for the classification of decep-
tion in a face-recognition paradigm. These findings support our a
priori prediction that the neural activity associated with perceptual
processes (i.e., activity in the precuneus) rather than executive pro-
cesses (i.e., activity in the frontal-parietal regions) can better reveal
deception.
The role of the precuneus in determining the familiarity of the
faces of long-term acquaintances, as well as those of newly encoded
faces, has been well verified. When viewing the faces of friends, the
precuneus participates in retrieving information on the mental states
and personality traits of the familiar person. In this connection,
Gobbini et al.40 reported stronger bilateral precuneus activity when
participants viewed personally familiar faces compared with familiar
faces of famous persons. Cavanna and Trimble41 further reported a
range of functional imaging studies involving precuneus activity and
summarized the functional roles of the precuneus; specifically, the
posterior precuneus appeared to be associated with successful epis-
odicmemory retrieval, whereas the anterior precuneus was related to
the retrieval mode only. Therefore, it is likely that the precuneus
activity observed while viewing familiar faces is related to the spon-
taneous activation of the semanticmemory of the personal attributes,
personality, and intentions of the personally familiar person42.
A clinical positron emission tomography study on patients with
mild to moderate Alzheimer’s disease further demonstrated that a
Figure 2 | The strength of the neural activity for familiar-face perception in the regions underlying the perceptual and executive processes in the lie and
truth conditions. The y-axis is the number of activated voxels (k) when the contrast images are thresholded to an uncorrected P, 0.05. The x-axis is the
number of subjects (n 5 13). The blue and red lines denote the activity associated with perceiving familiar and unfamiliar faces, respectively. The left and
right columns represent the lie and truth conditions, respectively.
Table 2 | The number of subjects among the 13 total subjects with
a greater number of activated voxels when perceiving familiar
compared with unfamiliar faces in the lie and truth conditions
Main effect Brain areas Lie Truth
Familiarity Precuneus 11 12
Cue Inferior frontal gyrus 9 0
Inferior parietal lobule 5 2
Table 3 | The number of subjects among the 13 total subjects with
fewer activated voxels when perceiving unfamiliar compared with
familiar faces in the lie and truth conditions
Main effect Brain areas Lie Truth
Familiarity Precuneus 13 13
Cue Inferior frontal gyrus 9 3
Inferior parietal lobule 10 8
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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reduction in the resting cerebral glucose consumption of the bilateral
precuneus was correlated with the severity of the autobiographical
memory impairment43. These data indicate that the functional role of
the precuneus fits well with the context of viewing familiar faces, and
precuneus activity in response to familiar faces is highly related to
context-richmemories that are called uponwhen viewing the faces of
acquaintances.
The activity of the precuneus when perceiving newly encoded
faces was clearly demonstrated in a study by Gobbini and Haxby34.
In this study, Gobbini and Haxby trained participants to become
familiar with the faces of three strangers one day prior to fMRI
scanning. Their results revealed a clear increase in left precuneus
activity when viewing the familiar faces relative to novel faces.
Because both the emotional reaction and the biographical informa-
tion associated with face viewing were well controlled in their studies
(because the familiarity was acquired a day prior to the experiment),
the observed precuneus activity should have been due only to the
acquired familiarity with the faces33,44. Other studies using personally
familiar faces have also reported that bilateral precuneus activity
plays an important role in retrieving information regarding the men-
tal states, personality traits, and other personal knowledge, such as
personal attributes and mental states, that is relevant to personally
familiar faces rather than famous familiar faces40,41.
We considered several possible explanations for our failure to
reach a 100% level of accuracy in predicting deception in the face-
recognition paradigm of the present study. Because the degree of
familiarity modulated the neural responses to faces in the precu-
neus40,44,45, we speculated that significant precuneus activity would
be observed only when an individual is viewing faces that reach a
certain threshold of familiarity. We were unable to verify this specu-
lation because the face stimuli employed in the familiar condition
were pre-selected according to a familiarity score above 5; the range
of variance was therefore greatly restricted, leading to bias with
regard to the correlation of familiarity scores and the BOLD signal
intensity in the precuneus. Future studies examining the effect of the
degree of familiarity and that of facial attractiveness will add import-
ant data to enrich the model propose here based on our findings.
This study has several methodological limitations that should be
acknowledged. As the first study to examine the neural activity assoc-
iated with perceptual processing during deception, we adopted a
tightly controlled laboratory paradigm to minimize the noise intro-
duced by real-life confounds. We fully recognize that the artificial
setting of the study, which involved minimal repercussions when the
participants lied, limits the generalizability of our findings beyond
the current experimental context and other applied settings. Future
studies may consider including a penalty for unsuccessful lying to
imitate the conditions that motivate lying in real-life settings.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the findings of the present
study add to the consensus based on fMRI deception studies that
the brain activity associated with automatic and unconscious percep-
tual processes occur much earlier than the conscious executive pro-
cesses of deception. Unlike the executive processes through which an
individual could employ various strategies to manipulate the cogni-
tive and behavioral outcomes, the automatic and unconscious nature
of the perceptual process suggests that it is less open to conscious
strategic manipulation, which in turn indicates its strong potential
for revealing the neural basis of deception.
Methods
Participants.We recruited 13 healthy Chinese males from the local community; the
participants were 25–37 years old (mean 5 28.39; SD 5 2.96) with an average of
16.2 years of education (SD 5 2.30). Right-handedness was confirmed using the
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory46. All of the subjects had normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no history of neurological and mental disorders. The study was
approved by the Institutional Review Board of TheUniversity of Hong Kong.Written
informed consent was obtained prior to participation in the study.
The experimental task. The experimental paradigm was a simple face-recognition
task. We obtained neutral face stimuli from photos of the male friends of the
participants and from those of other Chinese males to create two sets of stimuli: faces
of persons who were personally familiar to the participants (participants’ local
friends) and faces of unfamiliar persons (Chinese persons unknown to the
participants). Each participant rated the faces for familiarity and valence15. The
participants indicated whether they could provide the name of the person in each
photo and rated the familiarity and valence on a 9-point scale (1 being the lowest). For
the personally familiar faces, the actual experimental stimuli were selected if they
could be named correctly, with familiarity scores higher than 5 and valence scores of
4–6. For the unfamiliar faces, the experimental stimuli were chosen if the participants
could not name the person, provided a zero familiarity score, and received a valence
score of 4–6. These criteria were used to ensure that the participants viewed
personally familiar and entirely unfamiliar stimuli and to control for the possible
confounders of valence or the perceived attractiveness of the faces. To control for
differences in color tone, all of the stimuli were transformed to grayscale. The
luminance, contrast, and resolution of the photos were adjusted to approach
equivalence using Adobe Photoshop (San Jose, CA). All of the stimuli were matched
for age and personal likability (as per the self-report of the participants) of the people
in photos.
An event-related 2 3 2 factorial design was adopted using cue (truth/lie) and
familiarity (familiar/unfamiliar) as the two within-subject factors to combine into
four conditions: Truth-Familiar (TF), Truth-Unfamiliar (TU), Lie-Familiar (LF), and
Lie-Unfamiliar (LU). For example, if the cue was ‘‘Truth’’ and a familiar face was
presented, the participants were asked to press the key designating ‘‘yes’’ in the
response phase; if the cue was ‘‘Lie’’ and it was a familiar face, they were asked to press
the key designating ‘‘no’’ as soon as the question appeared. The task included 160
pseudo-randomized trials, and each condition had 40 trials. The response keys for yes
and no were counterbalanced among the participants.
At the beginning of each trial, a cue of either ‘‘truth’’ or ‘‘lie’’ was first presented
(1000 ms). A stimulus of either a ‘‘familiar’’ or an ‘‘unfamiliar’’ face then appeared on
the screen (perceptual phase, 600 ms). Subsequently, a fixation cross was shown
(formulation phase, 1200 ms). The question ‘‘Do you know him?’’ was then displayed
to prompt the participant to respond (response phase, 2000 ms). At the end of the
trial, a fixation cross was displayed for a varying duration (1500–3500 ms), which
differentiated the inter-stimulus-interval for the blood-oxygen-level-dependent
(BOLD) signal between trials.
Image acquisition. All of the fMRI data were acquired using a 3T scanner with
a standard head coil. A T1-weighted spin-echo pulse sequence (TR 5 7 ms,
TE 5 3.2 ms, slice thickness 5 1 mm) was employed to obtain structural images.
T2*-weighted gradient-echo echo-planar imaging pulse sequences (TR 5 1800 ms,
TE 5 30 ms, FoV 5 230 mm 3 230 mm, flip angle 5 90u, slice thickness 5 4 mm)
were used to acquire the functional images.
Data analysis. The first six volumes of each functional run were removed to ensure
the signal stability. Using SPM5, the functional images were corrected by realignment
and slice timing. The T1-image was segmented after coregistration using the mean
functional image. The corrected functional images were normalized using the
segmentation parameters. The East Asian brain template was used. The normalized
functional images were smoothed using an 8-mm full-width half-maximum
(FWHM) Gaussian filter. The hemodynamic response function was used to model
the fMRI signal, and a high-pass filter at 128 s was used to reduce the low-frequency
noise.
For each subject, four contrast images were configured for the four conditions and
entered into a second-level two-way ANOVA test accordingly. The interaction effects
of familiarity-by-cue and the main effects of familiarity and cue were examined. Post
hoc t-contrasts were performed to verify the direction of significance. In particular,
the t-contrast (familiar . unfamiliar) was used to examine the neural activity that
could indicate the perception of familiar faces. All of the statistical maps were thre-
sholded using a combined voxel-extent threshold (uncorrected voxel-level P, 0.001
and k . 65 voxels), which was determined as equivalent to corrected P , 0.05 by
AlphaSim (whole-brain as the search volume and 8 mm as the FWHM).
Further analyses were performed to compare the strength of the neural activity for
familiar-face perception in the regions underlying perceptual and executive processes
regardless of whether the subject had been cued to lie. These analyses were performed
by extracting the extent of the activity in the precuneus (which showed a significant
main effect of familiarity and therefore was identified as underlying the perceptual
process) and in the inferior frontal and inferior parietal regions (which showed a
significant main effect of cue and were therefore responsible for the executive
process). The number of voxels satisfying the uncorrected P, 0.05 threshold within
these areas was calculated in each condition. This threshold was used to avoid Type-II
errors because these search regions had previously been determined using a stringent
threshold that corrected for multiple comparisons. As further determined using
AlphaSim, cluster size differences of 44, 5, and 4 voxels were needed to define the
significant differences (corrected P , 0.05) between the activity for familiar and
unfamiliar faces for the left precuneus, inferior frontal, and inferior parietal regions,
respectively.
To further investigate whether precuneus activity was specific only to faces and not
to other forms of stimuli, we revisited the data of our previous fMRI deception study
that employed the same experimental design with the exception that the stimuli were
affective pictures selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) of
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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positive or negative valence15. We examined whether precuneus activity would also
reveal the true valence of the affective pictures that were viewed. The same procedures
were applied to determine the number of activated voxels in the precuneus for lying
versus truth-telling in the positive and negative valence conditions such that precu-
neus activity served as a neural marker to identify deception regardless of whether the
perceived valence was positive or negative.
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